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Book Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA: FARM 
WORKERS AND THE FRASER CASE, by Fay Faraday, 
Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker (eds) 1
JAMES A. GROSS 2
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (the Court) on 29 April 2011 issued its decision 
in Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser,3 the Court’s most recent attempt to defi ne 
the scope of constitutionally-protected freedom of association under section 2(d) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 Fraser involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of an Ontario statute, the Agricultural Employees Protection Act 
(AEPA),5 that, among other things, permitted farm workers in Ontario to make 
“representations” to their employers but required those employers only to listen to 
those representations, if made orally, or to read them, if written.6 Th e Court in Fraser 
found that the AEPA met the const itutional standard for freedom of association.
Th e thirteen authors (including the three editors) of eleven separate essays in 
this book focus on Canadian agricultural workers and their attempts to achieve 
eff ective and constitutionally-protected collective bargaining. Th e editors openly 
express their commitment to social justice for agricultural workers and to securing 
for them the labour rights and standards available to the “vast majority” of other 
workers in Ontario.7 In her introductory essay, Editor Judy Fudge, who was the 
Lansdowne Professor in Law at the University of Victoria when the book was 
published, describes the contributors to this collection of essays as “interested 
1. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 322 pages.
2. Professor, Cornell University.
3. 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser].
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11 [Charter].
5. SO 2002, c 16.
6. Ibid, s 1(2).
7. Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1, at ix.
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and partisan” and writes that the collection’s goal is to intervene “in the debate 
over the Charter’s application in the world of work rather than to provide a 
dispassionate refl ection on it.”8
Th e essays state a pro-farm-worker and pro-collective-bargaining point 
of view, but who could or should be disinterested about violations that deny 
workers their fundamental rights and cost them their livelihoods and even their 
lives? Whether “disinterested” or “advocate,” the standard of judgment should be 
whether every eff ort has been made to present relevant evidence thoroughly and 
accurately. Th e authors of these essays have met this high standard of scholarship.
As Professor Fudge explains, the book’s objective is to bring together two 
stories: the social as well as the legal context of Fraser. Consequently, the fi rst 
four essays discuss the struggle of farm workers to obtain collective bargaining 
rights in Ontario. In his essay, Editor Eric Tucker, Professor at Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, sets out to redress what he terms the “invisibility” 
of Ontario’s agricultural workers—the reality of their lives and their exclusion 
from protection—in the Court’s decision in Fraser.9 As a result of the Court’s 
failure to engage this “social reality,” Professor Tucker says the Court “move[d] 
to an abstract and, frankly, tendentious exercise of statutory interpretation.”10 
He presents two post-Fraser strategies to obtain collective bargaining rights 
for Ontario farm workers: one to abolish, through constitutional litigation, 
the exclusion of agricultural workers in Ontario from the protection of the 
law, which he believes holds “little promise”;11 the other to confront the 
“enormous challenge” of organizing farm workers and establishing collective 
bargaining “without ‘the law.’”12
Wayne Hanley, National President of United Food & Commercial Workers 
Canada (UFCW Canada), describes the challenges of organizing people who do 
dangerous and hazardous work in heat and high humidity, with toxic chemicals, 
and who are often immigrants with limited fl uency in English. Such workers are 
unlikely to raise workplace grievances because they fear deportation or blacklisting. 
Despite worker pleas that “[w]e’re human beings. We’re not farm animals. 
We have human rights,”13 Hanley laments that politics and corporate interests 
8. Judy Fudge, “Introduction: Farm Workers, Collective Bargaining Rights, and the Meaning of 
Constitutional Protection” in Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 5.
9. Eric Tucker, “Farm Worker Exceptionalism: Past, Present, and the post-Fraser Future” in 
Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 30.
10. Ibid at 47.
11. Ibid at 52.
12. Ibid at 56.
13. Wayne Hanley, “Th e Roots of Organizing Agriculture Workers in Canada” in Faraday, Fudge 
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have “trumped” farm workers’ rights even in provinces where labour law includes 
agricultural workers.14 Because he considers the law no friend to the people, 
he proposes action as the only legitimate response to Fraser, particularly the 
“election of governments and leaders who understand that workers’ rights are 
human rights.”15 
Kerry Preibisch, an Associate Professor at the University of Guelph, has spent 
more than a decade researching migration to Canada’s farm and food industry. She 
writes about the approximately forty thousand men and women from over seventy 
countries who enter Canada each year on temporary authorizations to work in the 
agri-food industry. Using a rights-based approach, she fi nds that the opportunities 
provided by labour migration to Canadian agriculture “come at a signifi cant cost 
to migrants’ freedom, security, and human dignity.”16 For example, she notes that 
Canada’s three “managed migration schemes”17 still refl ect the historic roles that 
race and gender have played in the country’s immigration policies so that migrants 
are perceived in “highly racialized terms,” adding to their social exclusion.18
Editor and social justice lawyer Fay Faraday, who was Counsel to UFCW 
Canada in the Fraser case, contributes an interesting transition essay, connecting 
Fraser’s social and legal contexts. She maintains that the Court’s failure to engage the 
equality argument raised in Fraser, based on section 15 of the Charter,19 has created 
a “disconnect or gap in which the court can express ‘sympathy’ for the vulnerable 
position of agricultural workers without confronting how law has been used 
to construct that very vulnerability.”20 Ms. Faraday also asserts that the exclusion 
of farm workers from collective bargaining “dispossesses them of their stake in 
workplace democracy, devalues their interest in participating in shaping the terms 
and conditions of their work, and deprives them of a remedy for their pre-existing 
disadvantages.”21 
& Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 58.
14. Ibid at 59.
15. Ibid at 80.
16. Kerry Preibisch, “Development as Remittances or Development as Freedom? Exploring 
Canada’s Temporary Migration Programs from a Rights-based Approach” in Faraday, Fudge 
& Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 82.
17. Ibid at 86.
18. Ibid at 100.
19. Charter, supra note 4 at s 15. Section 15 of the Charter provides that “every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefi t of the 
law without discrimination… .”
20. Fay Faraday, “Envisioning Equality: Analogous Grounds and Farm Workers’ Experience of 
Discrimination” in Faraday, Fudge, & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 111.
21. Ibid at 136.
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Th e book includes a photo essay by award-winning photographer Vincenzo 
Pietropaolo, which off ers what he terms a “glimpse” into the lives of Ontario’s 
migrant farm workers.22 It is moving and powerful. As I have written elsewhere, 
there is a danger in academic analysis and other musings to shift the focus of 
human rights away from those who are suff ering the real-life consequences of 
rights violations. Vincenzo Pietropaolo’s photo essay combats this tendency. 
Th e essay by Paul Cavalluzzo, senior partner in a Toronto law fi rm and counsel 
to UFCW Canada before the Court in Fraser, is the fi rst in the collection devoted 
solely to the judicial history and legal arguments in Fraser and related cases. He 
provides a chronological discussion that is very useful for readers not conversant with 
Canadian labour law. He points out, for example, that the enactment of the Charter 
raised the possibility that the Court would end the exclusion of farm workers from 
Ontario’s Labour Relations Act (LRA).23 Before that could be determined, Ontario, 
in 1994, enacted the Agricultural Labour Relations Act (ALRA),24 which provided, 
among other things, exclusive representation, a duty to bargain in good faith, and the 
right to grievance arbitration. Seventeen months later, a new government repealed 
the ALRA and amended the LRA to exclude farm workers from coverage. UFCW 
Canada challenged the repeal and exclusion as violations of section 2(d) of the 
Charter. In Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General),25 the Court ruled for the 
fi rst time that section 2(d) (and international human rights law) did protect 
certain activities that are part of the right to organize, such as “making majori-
ty representations to one’s employer.”26 While the Court in Dunmore did not 
change prior rulings that section 2(d) did not protect collective bargaining, it 
did direct the Ontario legislature, because of the vulnerability of agricultural 
workers, “to enact a statutory framework including protections of the freedom 
to organize.”27
In response to the Court directive in Dunmore, Ontario enacted the Agricultural 
Employees Protection Act (AEPA) in 2002.28 Cavalluzzo states that Ontario never 
intended to confer collective bargaining rights on farm workers nor even considered 
22. Vincenzo Pietropaolo, “Harvest Pilgrims: Migrant Farm Workers in Ontario” in Faraday, 
Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 139.
23. RSO 1980, c 228.
24. SO 1994, c 6.
25. 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore].
26. Paul JJ Cavalluzzo, “Th e Fraser Case: A Wrong Turn in a Fog of Judicial Deference” 
[Cavalluzzo, “Th e Fraser Case”] in Faraday, Fudge, & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 160.
27. Ibid at 161.
28. SO 2002, c 16.
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this an option.29 Th e AEPA did recognize a right to make representations to 
employers but obliged employers only to listen to those representations if made 
orally or to read them if written. Th e AEPA led to Fraser. 
While Fraser was winding its way through the court system, the Court decided 
in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British 
Columbia30 that collective bargaining was protected as an exercise of freedom 
of association under section 2(d) of the Charter. Th e Court defi ned collective 
bargaining both as a union of employees negotiating with employers on workplace 
issues or terms of employment and as the “duty to consult and negotiate in good 
faith.”31 In Fraser, the Court majority reaffi  rmed its decision in BC Health Services 
but still found that the AEPA met the freedom of association constitutional standard. 
Cavalluzzo contends that upholding BC Health Services should have led inevitably to 
the conclusion that the AEPA was unconstitutional. He and other essay authors 
say that the Court was able to rule as it did in Fraser only by implying (one might 
say concocting) a duty to bargain in good faith even when all parties to Fraser, 
and the other lower courts in Fraser, had agreed that the AEPA did not impose a 
duty to bargain. Cavalluzzo points out that, after struggling to achieve collective 
bargaining rights for almost forty years, Ontario farm workers were told by the 
majority of the Court in Fraser that their application was “premature” because 
there was as yet “scant” historical record under the AEPA.32 
In their essay, Steven Barrett and Ethan Poskanzer, partners in a labour law fi rm 
that represented the Canadian Labour Congress as an intervener in Fraser, explore the 
implications of Fraser for labour rights and rights litigation in Canada. Th ey are more 
optimistic than their fellow authors that the majority opinion in Fraser provides 
“strong reaffi  rmation” of the BC Health Services principle “that, at least at some 
fundamental level, collective bargaining is protected by section 2(d).”33 Th ey also 
maintain that freedom of association under section 2(d) would be “vacuous,” if it 
meant only that individuals were free to form associations.34 Barrett and Poskanzer 
view the duty to bargain, which the majority in Fraser found implicit in the AEPA, 
to be only a “derivative” right—necessary to ensure that collective bargaining is not 
reduced to a meaningless exercise—and not “an associational activity that per se is 
29. Cavalluzzo, “Th e Fraser Case,” supra note 24 at 161-62.
30. 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health Services].
31. Cavalluzzo, “Th e Fraser Case,” supra note 24 at 163.
32. Cavalluzzo, “Th e Fraser Case,” supra note 24 at 164-65.
33. Steven Barrett & Ethan Poskanzer, “What Fraser Means for Labour Rights in Canada” in 
Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 201-02.
34. Ibid at 206.
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protected by section 2(d).”35 Th ey also anticipate that the “question of whether the 
right to strike in itself falls within the section 2(d) guarantee” will soon appear 
before the courts.36 
Derek Fudge, Director of Policy Development for the National Union 
of Public and General Employees (NUPGE), charges that the Court in Fraser 
“turned its back on one of the most vulnerable groups of workers in Canada.”37 
In his opinion, when faced with eff orts by big business and government to repeal 
or restrict BC Health Services, the Court “handed down a political compromise 
decision.”38 Fudge reports that since BC Health Services, “fourteen labour laws have 
been passed in Canada that have restricted the bargaining rights of workers.”39 He 
calls for the labour movement to promote and defend its rights beyond the 
courts by reinforcing publicly and otherwise that “labour rights are indeed 
human rights.”40 
Consistent with that call, Patrick Macklem, Professor of Law at the University 
of Toronto, writes about a “fundamental transformation” in which the judiciaries in 
democratic societies are increasingly willing “to look to comparative, regional, and 
international legal developments for guidance in constitutional interpretation.”41 He 
cites the Court’s reliance in BC Health Services and other cases on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 
87 and 98; the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; as well as the 
fi ndings and recommendations of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association. 
Professor Macklem also points out that the ILO “has repeatedly assured Canada 
[that] a constitutional duty to bargain is not inconsistent with the protection that its 
instruments and principles extend to freedom of association.”42 While rejecting the 
“constitutional insularity prevalent south of the border,”43 Macklem cautions against 
intuitive acceptance of international human rights law without suffi  cient justifi cation 
for giving international law primacy over domestic legal orders. 
35. Ibid at 215.
36. Ibid at 197.
37. Derek Fudge, “Labour Rights: A Democratic Counterweight to Growing Income Inequality 
in Canada” in Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 234.
38. Ibid at 238.
39. Ibid at 241.
40. Ibid at 254.
41. Patrick Macklem, “Th e International Constitution” in Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra 
note 1 at 262.
42. Ibid at 282.
43. Ibid at 285.
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In the fi nal essay, Keith Ewing, Professor of Public Law at King’s College, 
London, and lawyer John Hendy, Q.C., agree that “it was perfectly proper 
for the SCC to rely on the ILO, the principles of which relating to collective 
bargaining do impose obligations on Canada.”44 Th ey address what they consider 
the unmerited infl uence that an article written by a Canadian academic had on 
Justice Rothstein’s “excoriating attack on [BC] Health Services” in his opinion 
in Fraser.45 Ewing and Hendy, after a detailed critique of that article, state 
that they are “perplexed” by the contention of the article’s author that Canada 
has no obligations to the ILO—a conclusion they say is supported neither by 
ILO jurisprudence nor by the legal obligations of all ILO member states.46 
More specifi cally, they assert that Canada “is bound by obligations relating 
to freedom of association by virtue of membership in the ILO,” enforced not 
only by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
but also the Declaration of Philadelphia (1948) in which Canada (and other 
member states) acknowledged a “solemn obligation” to “further” programs that 
will “achieve the eff ective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.”47 
Finally, in regard to the “duty to bargain” issue in Fraser, Ewing and Hendy 
state that the question should not have been whether there was a duty to bargain 
in good faith but, rather, “whether the right to make representations in AEPA 
was consistent with the duty to promote collective bargaining.”48 Th ey conclude, 
unlike the Court, that the AEPA is not consistent with either the ILO’s freedom 
of association principles or Canada’s duty to promote those principles.49 
It is diffi  cult in a book review to give due justice to eleven essays covering 
over three hundred pages. Consequently, I have attempted only to highlight 
certain key points in each essay. Th e theme of this book, addressed from various 
perspectives, is the suppression and destruction of human life. Th e editors dedicate 
the book to ten migrant farm workers who were killed and three who were 
injured when their van collided with another vehicle in Ontario. Th ey also 
include the driver of the other vehicle in the dedication. Th e editors recognize 
the humanity of all fourteen by listing their names. Too often, human life 
is so cheap that human beings are nameless. Th ose who deny workers their 
right of freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively with their 
44. KD Ewing & John Hendy, QC, “Giving Life to the ILO—Two Cheers for the SCC” in 
Faraday, Fudge & Tucker, eds, supra note 1 at 287 [emphasis in original].
45. Ibid at 299.
46. Ibid at 302.
47. Ibid at 303.
48. Ibid at 301.
49. Ibid at 305.
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employers deny workers’ humanity by making them servile, dependent, and 
powerless to protect themselves or to become involved in the decisions that 
directly aff ect their lives. Elsewhere, I have called this (and other inhumane 
workplace violations) a crime against humanity.50 
Th e Court’s decision in Fraser raises the likelihood that farm workers in 
Ontario will continue to be denied their constitutional and human right to 
collective bargaining. Th e purpose of rights, particularly human rights, is 
to eliminate or at least minimize the vulnerability that leaves people at the 
mercy of others who have the power to harm them. Th e Fraser narratives, 
although focused on the rights of agricultural workers in Ontario, provide 
painful but necessary reminders that workers’ rights, in regard to their realization 
and enforcement, have at best a fragile and perilous existence. Th is is true whenever 
the realization and enforcement of those rights are dependent on the shifting power 
of legislative policies or the values and value choices made by judges securely 
ensconced in their chambers, far removed from (and possibly ignorant of ) 
what goes on in fi elds, mills, factories, and offi  ces. 
Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case is 
a collection of essays that explores ways to advance the rights of farm workers in 
Canada. It is an important book on that score alone but also because it has serious 
implications for workers’ rights and human rights everywhere. 
50. James Gross, A Shameful Business: Th e Case for Human Rights in the American Workplace 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).
